We examine the market reaction to events related to the standard-setting process of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 for over 3,000 European firms that have adopted the IFRS. We find that the market reaction to IFRS 9 is largely affected by firm specific factors associated with information quality and information asymmetry. In particular, lower information asymmetry and higher information quality have a positive effect on market-adjusted returns. This is in conflict with the common view that IFRS 9 will improve accounting quality for those firms that need it most (namely, small firms with low liquidity and concentrated ownership structure).
Introduction
We investigate how investors respond to the standard-setting process of new International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 -Financial Instruments -issued by the International Accounting Standards Boards (IASB) in 2014.
In particular, we examine whether firm-specific factors associated with information quality and information asymmetry affect the market reaction to the IFRS 9 adoption events. This analysis is deemed necessary, because the evolving literature on capitalmarket effects of IFRS indicates that firm characteristics require further investigation, such to better identify the drivers of the heterogeneity in the economic consequences (Daske et al., 2008 and Armstrong et al., 2010; Byard et al., 2011; Christensen et al., 2013; Joos and Leung, 2013; Dos Santos et al., 2016) . Furthermore, an understanding of the capital-market outcomes of IFRS 9 is of interest to policy makers, as it helps evaluating whether the reform leads to higher financial reporting quality, and thus benefits international investors (IASB, 2014; European Commission, 2015) .
In this study, following Onali and Ginesti (2014) , we explore the impact of the IFRS 9 adoption by measuring variations in the three-day market adjusted return (3day MAR) and by taking into account the effect on the MAR due to several economic factors. Unlike previous studies, we also take into account variations in the MAR that are due to systematic patterns in stock returns during the week (day-of-the-week effects), as well as Fama-French (FFF) and Carhart factors (CF). Such an approach allows us to considerably reduce the bias in the estimated MAR that may result from market-wide temporal patterns in returns or other firm-level characteristics.
The results of our analysis reveal that the impact of the IFRS 9 adoption events varies across companies. Specifically, the IFRS 9 adoption events have a stronger impact on firms with higher information quality and lower information asymmetry.
Moreover, financial firms react worse than non-financial firms to IFRS 9 adoption events.
We emphasize that our main contribution to the literature is twofold. First of all, by considering a large dataset of European listed firms, we perform a new and comprehensive investigation on the firm-level heterogeneities in the reaction to all events related to the standard-setting process of IFRS 9. Second, we provide novel empirical evidence of the fact that, contrary to a quite common view (see, for example, Armstrong et al., 2010) , the IFRS adoption may not improve accounting quality for firms with low liquidity and high information asymmetry.
This study is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the methodology and the data, Section 3 presents and discusses the main results obtained and Section 4 concludes.
Methodology and data

Event dates
We identify the IFRS 9 adoption events based on the public announcements provided by the IASB and the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG). We use the LEXIS/NEXIS database to control for potentially confounding news during each event window. Such a procedure leads to a set of 22 IFRS 9 adoption events, which are reported in Table 1 . 1 A natural concern when conducting an event studies is whether the events considered are actually relevant to investors. To control for the relevance of the 22 events for investors, similar to Da et al. (2011) , we examine the extent to which the Google Search Volume Index (SVI) for the keyword "IFRS 9" is higher in weeks around these events. We run a two-sample t-test for the time period from 05/07/2009 to 06/09/2014, and we find that in the weeks around the 22 IFRS 9 events considered the SVI is significantly larger (at the 1% level).
[Insert Table 1 : IFRS 9 Events]
Methodology
We calculate the MAR as the difference between the 3-day log stock return and the log return of the proxy for the market portfolio. As a proxy for the market portfolio, we adopt the DJ STOXX Global 1800 Index Ex Europe (Armstrong et al., 2010) . To examine the cross sectional determinants of MAR, we run regressions of the MAR for each firm i and event t on a set of firm-level covariates. In particular, to take into account the incremental effect of firm-specific factors, we implement several regression models (all the variables are described in Table 2 ). Specifically, we start from the following baseline specification focusing on factors related to information quality and information asymmetry: (2013), we multiply factor scores by minus 1, so that higher values of INFOQUAL correspond to lower information quality. Moreover, we add an interaction between FINANCIAL and INFOQUAL, to estimate the incremental market reaction for those financial firms with lower quality information.
We also examine the role of asymmetric information by estimating the effect of bid-ask spreads (SPREAD). A larger spread would be consistent with a higher degree of asymmetric information (Ball et al., 2012; Daske et al., 2013) . In addition to this variable, we also include BIG_4 and INDEP. In particular, a positive coefficient on BIG_4 would be consistent with lower information asymmetry, because Big 4 auditor firms should provide better auditing reports and stronger monitoring (Joos and Leung, 2013) . A positive coefficient on INDEP would, similarly, indicate lower information asymmetry, because of the lack of shareholders with very large shareholdings. As Adams et al. (2011) explain, this variable captures the degree of independence of a company, and its board, from its large shareholders. The variables HERF and CODE are calculated based on prior studies (Ding et al., 2007; Armstrong et al., 2010) . We define each industry according to the primary two-digit SIC code. Following Petersen, 
Results
An analysis of pairwise correlation coefficients between MAR and the explanatory variables (which we do not report to save space) indicates a positive effect of information quality and a negative effect of information asymmetry: the correlation coefficients for BIG_4 and INDEP are positive and significant while the coefficient for SPREAD is negative and significant. We also find a negative and significant correlation between INFOQUAL and the BIG_4, and INDEP, and a positive and significant correlation between INFOQUAL and SPREAD, in accordance with the intuition that firms with lower information quality have higher information asymmetry.
The results reported in Table 3 are very robust across all specifications and suggest that financial firms tend to have lower MAR relative to non-financial firms. The coefficients on INFOQUAL are always negative and significant, suggesting that firms with lower pre-adoption information quality react negatively to the IFRS 9. These findings are confirmed by the positive coefficients on SIZE (at the 1% level) and MARKETS (at the 10% level). Moreover, the coefficients on the interaction term, namely FINANCIAL* INFOQUAL, are insignificant across all regression specifications. Therefore, we conclude that pre-adoption information quality does not have a different impact on the cross-section of MAR for financial firms relative to non-financial firms.
The coefficients on BIG_4 are positive and significant, while those on SPREAD are negative and significant. BIG_4 is supposed to be negatively related to information asymmetry, while a higher SPREAD reflects a higher degree of information asymmetry. Therefore, our results suggest that pre-adoption information asymmetry has a negative effect on the price reaction to IFRS 9. The other variables controlling for information asymmetry are either weakly significant (INDEP) (1)-(4) ). Nevertheless, the coefficient on MARKETS loses significance.
[Insert Table 3 : Firm-level regressions: cross sectional determinants of MAR]
Robustness tests
Let us test the robustness of our results. First, we run the six regressions considered in Section 2 using different levels of clustering (at country level, at industry level and at event level). Second, we repeat the main analysis, after replacing the dependent variable (3-day MAR) with its values computed three days before and after the actual event as well as five days before and after the actual event. This type of tests is similar to those implemented in studies using a difference-in-differences approach such as Waldinger (2010). The results obtained (which we do not report to save space) are in line with those reported in the previous subsection, thus confirming the validity of our main inferences. 5
Conclusions
We have investigated the investors' reaction to the standard-setting process of IFRS 9 for over 3,000 European listed firms.
Our study offers novel and robust evidence that higher pre-adoption information quality and lower pre-adoption information asymmetry have a positive impact on the MAR. In particular, the MAR is positively related with size, a dispersed ownership structure, market liquidity for the firm's stock, and having a Big 4 auditor. We also provide evidence that financial firms react relatively worse than non-financial firms to the IFRS 9 adoption events.
Our findings support the argument that IFRS 9 adoption may not, per se, lead to higher accounting quality for all firms and are starkly different from the results reported by Armstrong et al. (2010) , who document an incrementally positive reaction for firms with lower pre-adoption information quality and higher pre-adoption information asymmetry in response to the compulsory IFRS adoption in 2005. Overall, our study suggests that IFRS 9 is likely to be less beneficial to financial firms, small firms, firms listed only on one (non-US) stock market, firms without Big 4 auditors, firms with a concentrated ownership structure, and firms with poor market liquidity. -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.010** (-3.341) (-3.289) (-3.212) (-2.986) (-2.578) (-2.225) HERF -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 (-0.986) (-1.343) (-1.011) (-0.869) (-1.406) (-1.373) CODE -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 ( Table 3 reports the results for the cross-sectional determinants of the 3-day MAR. Standard errors are clustered at both the industry and country level for Eq. (3) and Eq. (6). *** Denotes significance at the 1% level, ** Denotes significance at the 5% level. * Denotes significance at the 10% level.
